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THE SUCCESSES AND FAILURES OF PRESIDENTIAL
POLICY ON COMMERCIAL AIR TRAVEL
DANIEL, K. BUBB*
N THE YEARS following World War II, the airline industry
experienced unprecedented growth in passenger volume. In
fact, the statistics were so impressive that airline executives had
to accelerate their plans to add more airplanes to their fleets.
However, the expansion of the commercial air travel industry
did not come without its problems. Industry specialists repeat-
edly recalled how on numerous occasions, especially prior to
World War II, the industry nearly collapsed. In fact, one scholar
mostly attributed the rocky history of the airline industry to
"some of the [government] legislation [designed to regulate the
industry] that has been inadequate, ineffective, or misguided."'
All too frequently, government officials faced the same di-
lemma. If they regulated the industry too much, it would pre-
vent economic growth. But, at the same time, if they relaxed
regulation, then too many air carriers would enter the market,
thereby eliminating any hope of profitability for anyone.
Change finally came when, under substantial pressure from in-
dustry leaders and members of Congress, on October 28, 1978,
President Jimmy Carter signed into law the landmark Airline
Deregulation Act, which completely changed the airline indus-
try's future.2 This article is not about regulation and deregula-
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1 CLAUDE E. PUFFER, AIR TRANSPORTATION vii (1941).
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tion of the airlines. Instead, it will examine the historic effect of
federal policy on the commercial air transportation industry in
the twentieth century.
I. THE FORMATIVE YEARS: 1917-1928
Traditionally, most scholars who study the commercial air
transportation industry focus on economic and political aspects
but do not provide a comprehensive discussion of the historic
effect of federal policy on the industry. In fact their works fre-
quently overlook the landmark date, May 15, 1917, when Presi-
dent Woodrow Wilson allocated $50,000 for airplanes, pilots,
maintenance personnel, and facilities to commence regularly
scheduled airmail service by the Post Office from New York to
Washington D.C 3 Instead, the majority of scholars begin their
studies with May 13, 1926, when President Coolidge signed the
Air Commerce Act into law and the first passenger service began
in the United States.4 This date, these scholars claim, was the
true birth of the commercial air travel industry.
But prior to enactment of the Air Commerce Act, the profit-
ability of commercial air carriers relied on airmail contracts
awarded them from the Postmaster General. Under the Kelly
Act of 1925, Congress determined it was no longer economically
feasible for the Post Office to continue carrying airmail by itself,
and instead, offered service routes to commercial airlines. 5 At
least five major airlines seized the opportunity (United, Ameri-
can, Western Air Express, Bonanza, and TWA) and immediately
began developing plans to expand their fleets, bid for more
routes, and increase the number of flights on already existing
routes that were the most profitable.6
However, these airlines became nervous when smaller carriers
began submitting applications to Postmaster General Walter Fol-
ger Brown to fly some of the same routes that the major airlines
flew.7 Airline management expressed its concern to the federal
government about lax oversight and the lack of safety regula-
tions.8 Pilots complained of poorly maintained navigation
equipment and long workdays, which both increased their wor-
3 NICK A. KOMONS, BONFIRES TO BEACONS: FEDERAL CIVIL AVIATION POLICY
UNDER THE AIR COMMERCE ACT 1926-1938 86 (1978).
4 Id.
5 PUFFER, supra note 1, at 2-3.
6 Mc Carran Field Shows Traffic Increase, LAS VEGAS SUN, March 5, 1960, at 5.
7 PUFFER, supra note 1, at 2-3.
8 Id. at 548-88.
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kload and jeopardized their safety.' To add to the problem, the
country lacked air traffic control centers and airport towers to
guide the aircraft, thereby placing full responsibility on the pi-
lots to maintain their own vigilance by looking for other aircraft,
communicating with them, and sequencing each other for take-
off and landing.'0 Government officials began to wonder if reg-
ulation was the appropriate policy, especially as the Postmaster
General awarded more contracts to new carriers.'" Cabinet ad-
visers to President Coolidge, and later President Hoover,
echoed the concerns of industry leaders.'" Hoover's own direc-
tor of transportation questioned whether it was wise for regula-
tion of the air transportation industry to be placed under direct
control of the Department of Commerce, Hoover's former em-
ployer.'" Congress wanted independent commissions to regu-
late the industry, but the President never made a decision, and
in fact ordered Postmaster General Brown to deal with the situa-
tion.' 4 In the end, both Hoover and Brown balked, leaving the
Roosevelt administration with a monumental task of resolving a
tenuous and potentially volatile situation.15
II. THE PRE-WAR YEARS: 1928-1938
Upon entering the Presidency, Franklin Delano Roosevelt
quickly sized up the crisis facing the commercial air transporta-
tion industry. He summoned his advisers and directed them to
examine the situation and submit a report to him detailing their
findings. They were unaware that during Hoover's tenure as
President, airmail contracts were set to expire on October 7,
1929, with no concrete plans for renewing them in the future.6
Additionally, in 1930 Alabama Senator Hugo Black led a Con-
gressionally-appointed committee to investigate alleged corrupt
practices by Postmaster General Brown, who privately author-
ized the Williams Air Service Corporation to fly its planes from




12 TOM D. CROUCH, WINGS: A HIsToR OF AVIATION FROM KITES TO THE SPACE
AGE 235-36 (2003).
13 Id.
14 Id. at 271-72.
15 Id.
16 PUFFER, supra note 1, at 197.
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ing lower bids for the route.17 That same year, the Republican-
led Congress pushed for the passage of the Watres Act which
transferred responsibility for regulating the air transportation
industry from the Department of Commerce to the Interstate
Commerce Commission ("ICC"). The Republicans felt that
the ICC was more capable, experienced, and better equipped to
oversee the industry.' 9
The Watres Act, however, also contained a serious flaw. It
voided all airmail contracts and awarded them to the army, leav-
ing the airline industry in complete chaos. 2' The Democrats saw
an opportunity to make policy changes. Pointing out that the
army, much like the post office, was incapable of handling such
a growing industry, the Democrats reasoned that the army
would have tried to pawn the industry to the cheapest private
bidders, thereby defeating the regulation's purpose.2' The
Democrats also asserted that the army had experienced too
many aircraft accidents, thereby forcing it to reduce flight oper-
ations to a limited status.22 Recognizing the egregious legislative
error, Congress reinstated all contracts to the major air carriers,
even granting them ten-year extensions.23 (In addition, Presi-
dent Roosevelt directed the ICC to regulate rates and revenues.)
But this did not solve the larger, more immediate problem fac-
ing the air transportation industry.
III. THE WAR & ANTEBELLUM YEARS:
DECLINE & RECOVERY 1939-1950
By the summer of 1938, a severe recession consuming the
country's economy also affected the airline industry. According
to John Frederick, a professor of business and economics, the
"entire [airline] industry was in a chaotic state, with several ma-
jor carriers facing bankruptcy, half the original investment in
the airlines lost forever, and new capital so backward as to be
practically unobtainable. '24 Passenger air travel declined, forc-
ing airline management to go to extraordinary measures includ-
ing streamlining company operations just to financially break





22 Id. at 198.
23 Id.
24 JOHN H. FREDERICK, COMMERCIAL AIR TRANSPORTATION 76 (5th ed. 1961).
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even. Because the railroads did not have the equipment to
transport thousands of military troops to United States military
bases in preparation to go overseas, the airlines had to pick up
the slack.2" Additionally, military leaders needed more air-
planes to transport troops and cargo to Europe, so they turned
to the airline industry for help in the form of planes and pi-
lots. 21 When airline personnel and planes returned from mili-
tary service, airline mechanics spent endless hours trying to
retrofit the planes to meet Civil Aeronautics Board ("CAB") pas-
senger plane specifications, thereby reducing ground support
needed for flight operations, consequently delaying flights,
which cost the airlines thousands of dollars.2 7 Relief finally
came just a few months before the end of the War when the
Army and Surplus Property Board authorized the return of
more airplanes and pilots to help reduce the stress being placed
upon an airline industry that was already stretched to its limit.28
But nothing could prepare airline and airport officials for the
unexpected boom in air travel after the end of World War II
that would stretch the airlines even thinner and force local air-
port officials to further expand their budgets to include costs for
improving their inadequate and outdated airport facilities.
After the War ended, as the nation mourned the passing of
President Roosevelt, Harry Truman was left with an enormous
responsibility he did not expect to inherit. Not being an avia-
tion enthusiast, and in fact harboring a fear of flying, Truman
was not sensitive to the needs of the airline industry. Because
Americans saved their money during the War and enjoyed more
leisure time to spend with their families thanks to New Deal leg-
islation, Truman finally acquiesced to the demands of the air-
line industry, and provided federal financial assistance to add
larger and faster airplanes to its fleets. He also agreed to help
airport officials who desperately needed funds to improve pas-
senger facilities and lengthen and reinforce runways and taxi-
ways. After all, as Professor Frederick points out "by the end of
1945, passenger traffic had already grown to nearly two and a
half times its 1941 size."29 However, the boom following the
War temporarily leveled off from 1946-1948, giving airline man-
agement and airport officials a brief opportunity to make other
25 Id. at 77.
2 Id. at 78.
27 Id. at 81.
28 Id. at 84.
29 Id. at 96.
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necessary changes to their operations and facilities.3 ° In 1947,
Truman issued Executive Order 9781 mandating the creation of
the Air Coordinating Committee, whose responsibility was to ad-
vise the President on important questions and issues brought
forth by the airline industry.3 When the Korean Conflict began
in 1950, passenger demand once again skyrocketed, forcing air-
line management to expand their operations and local airport
officials to revise their budgets to include facility upgrades. 2 As
usual, federal funding came slowly and was woefully inadequate
to assist airlines and airport management.
IV. INDUSTRY GROWTH AND REFORM 1951-1959
With a new Commander in Chief in the White House, airline
officials hoped that this time they would have a more sympa-
thetic and compliant President. However, from the beginning
of his tenure, Dwight Eisenhower was straitjacketed from accom-
plishing any of his immediate aviation-related goals because of
partisan politics. Congress considered the Civil Aeronautics As-
sociation a third-tier, poorly organized, incompetent govern-
ment agency that deserved little funding if any at all.33
Additionally, in 1951, inflation slowed the nation's economy, re-
ducing Congressional funding earmarked for the aviation indus-
try.34 The expense of the Korean Conflict also forced a
reduction in aviation funding from $187 million in 1950 to $136
million in 1953." As a result, navigation equipment could not
be repaired in time for the growing number of flights and new
air routes, thereby congesting the skies and airports and causing
considerable delays. 36 Airport terminals lacked proper up-
grades, resulting in limited ticket counter space for airlines,
smaller waiting areas for passengers, and inadequate parking
spaces for automobiles and other ground vehicles. 37 Air traffic
control centers and towers had to operate with limited staff,
30 Id. at 87.
31 DONALD W. NyRop, THE ROLE OF COMPETITION IN COMMERCIAL AIR TRANS-
PORTATION: A REPORT OF THE CIVIL AERONAUTICS BOARD 33 (United States Gov-
ernment Press 1952).
32 Id.
33 STUART I. ROCHESTER, TAKEOFF AT MID-CENTURY: FEDERAL CIVIL AVIATION
POLICY IN THE EISENHOWER YEARS 1953-1961 18 (1976).
34 Id.
35 Id.
36 Id. at 33.
37 Id. at 34.
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forcing employees to work long hours and in many cases over-
time, thereby creating a potentially dangerous situation."
In 1954, Eisenhower demanded the Air Coordinating Com-
mittee provide him with a comprehensive review of the airline
industry. 9 He pressured Congress to allocate additional funds
to reduce the stress on the industry.4° However, that meant cut-
ting funding to other programs in more need of federal govern-
ment assistance than the airlines. As a result, inadequate federal
funding frequently became the norm for airlines and airports.
Budget cuts, antiquated navigation and airport equipment
were not the only immediate concerns facing the airline indus-
try and airport officials. In 1956, the inauguration of jets not
only revolutionized the airline industry, but also consumed a sig-
nificant portion of airline budgets because jets proved to be
quite costly to operate. Commercial airports needed reinforced
and lengthened runways and taxiways. Terminal buildings re-
quired new bridges and equipment to handle jet aircraft. All of
these capital expenditures put significant pressure on the profit-
ability of commercial airlines.
Eisenhower and his advisers had been planning for the arrival
of the jet age. In 1956, they commissioned William Barclay Har-
ding, a seasoned pilot and government representative in inter-
national aviation financing to chair the Committee on
Transport Policy and Organization.4' His central task was to
provide a comprehensive report analyzing the impact of jet air-
craft on the airlines and nation's airports.42 The study led to an
obvious question: how to modify the airline industry and na-
tion's airports to accommodate jets? However, before the fed-
eral government could take any action, a tragic event provided
the wake up call the federal government needed to recognize
the crisis looming over the entire air transportation industry
system.
On June 30, 1956, a TWA Super Constellation propeller-
driven airplane carrying sixty-four passengers and a United Air-
lines DC-7 propeller-driven airplane carrying fifty-three passen-
gers collided over the Grand Canyon killing everyone on board
both planes.43 Despite the fact that the weather was clear, the
38 Id.
39 Id. at 54.
40 Id. at 55.
41 Id. at 82-83.
42 Id.
43 Id. at 126-27.
2006] 659
JOURNAL OF AIR LAW AND COMMERCE
CAB determined that the pilots did not see each other and
failed to react in time to avoid the collision.4 Because the
planes were flying in uncontrolled airspace, the director of air
traffic control denied any responsibility for the accident.45 Iron-
ically, the Civil Aviation Authority had been working on a plan
to overhaul the nation's air traffic control system, including the
expansion of controlled airspace.46 Congress had approved
their five-year plan but did not provide adequate funding in
time to complete the project.47 Newspaper headlines nation-
wide pointed out the obvious problem: the government was un-
equipped to handle the rapidly expanding air traffic, especially
jets.48 The American public angrily criticized the government,
but specifically targeted the Civil Aviation Authority for not do-
ingitsjob.4 9 Washington finally realized that it did not need just
an oversight board, but an entire separate, independent agency
to handle all aviation affairs. On June 23, 1958, on the twenti-
eth anniversary of the Civil Aeronautics Act of 1938, both Con-
gress and President Eisenhower proudly introduced to America
the new Federal Aviation Administration.5 °
V. THE JET AGE & DEREGULATION: 1960-PRESENT
With Cold War tensions growing and increasing internal pol-
icy disputes among divisions within the FAA, Congress drafted
and approved Senate Bill S. 3880, which directed the FAA Ad-
ministrator to provide a plan of wartime procedures, and con-
duct a study of "special personnel problems," with
recommendations to be submitted to Congress. 51 Legislators
and the President felt that this bill would remedy the internal
problems dividing the FAA, while simultaneously providing air-
line passengers and personnel a sense of national security.52 Ad-
ditionally, the federal aviation budget needed to be increased.
In 1960, the FAA Administrator requested $587 million from
the federal government. However, Congress felt that there had
- Id. at 127.
45 Id. at 127.
46 Id. at 128.
47 Id. at 128.
48 Id. at 128.
49 Id. at 128.
50 Id. at 214.
51 Id. at 210.
52 Id. at 290-91.
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been wasteful spending by the Administration and approved the
allocation of only $535 million. 53
Journalists and aviation industry leaders claimed this was typi-
cal Eisenhower policy, attempting to keep costs at a minimum.
As Stuart Rochester, a professor of Aviation History points out,
most of "the Eisenhower initiatives had been characterized more
by rhetoric than substance, more by the grand pronouncement
or the token overture than the decisive action. . . . Too often
staff studies were substituted for executive action. ' 54 But, Roch-
ester ultimately concludes that it was not entirely Eisenhower's
fault. He claims that "Eisenhower had inherited from Truman a
spotty, unfocused aviation program and could bequeath to Ken-
nedy a still flawed but measurably sounder foundation for the
future. '55 However, Kennedy not only inherited a badly under-
staffed and internally divided FAA, but more importantly, a rap-
idly growing airline industry that threatened to burst the entire
commercial aviation system at its seams.
Despite the fact that in the 1960s the federal government lim-
ited the number of air routes awarded to airlines, the industry
could not keep up with the increasing demand of passenger
travel, both domestically and internationally. As airlines pur-
chased larger and faster jets, airport officials again found them-
selves unprepared to meet the challenge. In fact, as early as
1954, European aircraft manufacturers had been researching
and experimenting with the concept of a supersonic transport
jet ("SST") .56 During the Eisenhower administration, Congress
was not interested in funding research for the SST. First, legisla-
tors were too busy trying to comply with requests from airport
officials nationwide for federal financial assistance. More im-
portantly, they questioned whether the SST was economically vi-
able and environmentally sound. 57 Kennedy, however, was
more sympathetic to not only expanding the role of the FAA,
but also to supersonic jet travel. He asked Congress to appropri-
ate $750 million to develop the program, which Congress
granted, but only after an exhaustive $11 million study had been
completed. 58 Airline industry leaders felt they finally had an ally
in the White House who not only would listen to their concerns,
53 Id. at 238-39.
54 Id. at 290-91.
55 Id. at 291.
56 CROUCH, supra note 12, at 624-25.
57 Id.
58 Id. at 625.
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but also demand federal compliance. That excitement abruptly
ended upon the tragic news of Kennedy's assassination. Indus-
try officials could only hope that Lyndon Johnson would be
equally or more sympathetic to the industry needs.
Johnson's aviation policies did not accomplish much more
than Kennedy's. In fact, Johnson focused more of his attention
on civil rights legislation than the airline industry. However, he
could not ignore the airlines for long. With monthly increases
in the number of flights, the implementation of larger passen-
ger jets, and airport terminals that were inadequately equipped
to accommodate the rapidly expanding passenger volume, the
federal government soon felt pressure not only from local politi-
cal officials, but also from powerful labor union leaders de-
manding immediate action to address these problems. 59 As a
result, Johnson pressed the Congress for funding to remedy the
crisis facing the airline industry.6"
President Nixon, like Johnson, also recognized that commer-
cial aviation was a significant part of the United States economy.
He expressed a sincere interest in promoting and expanding
the industry. For example, in his annual report on United
States Aeronautics and Space Activities to Congress, Nixon
lauded progress in civil aviation, especially for the "substantial
contributions to continued pre-eminence in civil aviation, major
improvements in aeronautical services, and impressive develop-
ments in a sound SST (Supersonic Transport) program."'" By
1971, the passenger volume began to rise dramatically and con-
tinued this increase during the later years of the Vietnam War.62
When Nixon was forced to resign from his office as President,
airline industry leaders wondered if his then vice-president and
successor, Gerald Ford would be equally enthusiastic and sup-
portive of commercial aviation. Their hopes for the continued
support of a strong President would soon be dashed.
In the year prior to Ford's inauguration as President, certain
members of Congress who oversaw a number of aviation sub-
committees became concerned when they received a report de-
tailing uneven airfare price structures on the West and East
59 T.A. HEPPENHEIMER, TURBULENT SKIES: THE HISTORY OF COMMERCIAL AViA-
TION 267 (1995).
60 Id.
61 RICHARD M. NIXON, MESSAGE TO THE CONGRESS TRANSMITrING ANNUAL RE-
PORT ON UNITED STATES AERONAUTICS AND SPACE ACTVITIES ANNUAL REPORT ON




Coasts."3 Massachusetts Senator Edward Kennedy launched a
Congressional investigation, asserting that the price structure
needed overhauling.64 According to Daniel Kaplan, a former
Director of the Office of Economic Analysis, Kennedy's findings
overwhelmingly "convince[d] others in the government of the
benefits of reform."" 5 Even President Ford supported the Sena-
tor's findings and recommendations." 6 However, in Ford's first
year in office as President, the nation experienced a sharp reces-
sion, largely caused by inflation, forcing Congress to reduce
funding for commercial aviation.17 Airline management and la-
bor union leaders braced themselves for the worst. But, instead
of increasing funding to the airlines, the Ford administration
offered to slowly reduce regulation (an approach once unsuc-
cessfully tried by the Nixon administration)." The results were
disastrous. Passenger jets departed airports only half-full,
sharply cutting into airline profitability. 69 Regardless, govern-
ment officials continued to entertain the notion of additional
reform even if it meant deregulating the industry.
Airline leaders cringed at the thought of such an idea. In
fact, the most vocal opponents were TWA, Eastern, and Ameri-
can executives who feared losing their most profitable routes to
other smaller air carriers should the government authorize der-
egulation.70 United was the only airline to support deregulation
because the FAA had authorized it to serve only one new market
outside of its regular service routes, costing the airline potential
revenue." As the Ford administration approached the end of
its tenure in office, deregulation seemed inevitable. Finally, af-
ter months of Senate hearings, Congress overwhelmingly ap-
proved deregulation of the airline industry.7 2 The Senate voted
in favor of the measure by 83 to 9, and the House 363 to 8.7 On
October 28, 1978, President Jimmy Carter signed into law the








70 Id. at 33.
71 Id.
72 See id. at 34.
73 Id.
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Airline Deregulation Act, a landmark piece of legislation that
completely changed the airline industry's future.74
The purpose behind the Airline Deregulation Act not only
was to reduce the CAB's control over airline industry regulation,
but eventually to eliminate the CAB altogether. In fact, the gov-
ernment proposed to dissolve the Board by January 1, 1985. 75
Other stipulations of the Act included implementing a reasona-
ble airfare structure, assuring service to smaller communities
(which practically had been non-existent during regulation),
and most importantly, allowing other smaller air carriers to com-
pete in a growing domestic and global market.76 Carter and his
administration firmly believed that deregulating the airline in-
dustry was the right thing to do.
However, deregulation did not solve the immediate problems
facing the airlines. Passenger demand continued to increase
rapidly, as did the number of planes, which represented signifi-
cant capital investments for the carriers. New carriers flooded
the market, significantly reducing fares.77  Major airlines
watched their profit margins narrow with the added competi-
tion. In fact, in May 1982, after enjoying years of profitability
and company expansion during the early to mid 1970s, Braniff
Airlines, the nation's tenth largest airline filed for bankruptcy,
largely due to high fuel prices and a stagnant United States
economy. 7 The airline never recovered and was forced to liqui-
date all of its assets to pay its massive debt. 79 Soon thereafter,
other major airlines watched their profits diminish, while even
more regional air carriers entered the market.8 ° Further adding
to the industry's woes, fearless corporate raiders such as Frank
Lorenzo (Eastern Airlines) and Carl Icahn (TWA) patiently
waited to pounce on opportunities to become majority stock
shareholders in financially weak airlines to eventually gain com-
plete control and plunder the companies of all their assets.
These ruthless aviation magnates sent bone-chilling terror rip-
pling throughout the entire airline industry, specifically target-
ing executives of major airlines who feared that their companies
too might fall prey to corporate raiding. As a result, the only
74 See id.
75 Id. at 34.
76 Id. at 34-37.






seemingly plausible option for the major airlines was to merge,
which some did during the Reagan and Clinton administrations.
With the commercial air travel industry in chaos as a result of
deregulation and just one year into Ronald Reagan's presidency,
the Professional Air Traffic Controller Organization ("PATCO")
announced a strike.8' This had devastating consequences on
the airlines as thousands of air traffic controllers nationwide re-
fused to work. Instead of negotiating PATCO, President Reagan
promptly fired the controllers.82 Recruits soon replaced the
striking controllers, forcing managers to work at a feverish pace
to properly train new workers.83 Airline executives had to
streamline operations and sharply revise their budgets just to
keep their companies afloat.84
Matters worsened when, in 1983, Continental Airlines pilots
and flight attendants went on strike, demanding better pay and
work hours. 5 Two years later, United Airlines pilots followed
suit. 6 Neither President Reagan nor the Republican Congress
were sympathetic to the strikes. Airline management certainly
disapproved of the strikes, and refused to negotiate with the pi-
lots' unions. Airline analyst Peter Capelli explained how "the
more aggressive tactics used by management appear to have
been the main factor shifting the balance of power away from
the airline unions in collective bargaining."87 He added that
well into the early 1990s "once management was able to win
strikes, union power eroded and the carriers secured conces-
sions even when the industry was experiencing record growth
and profits." '88 Despite continued passenger demand, profitabil-
ity in the industry diminished not only due to high fuel prices
and an inflated market with too many competitors, but also a
recession that lasted well into George H.W. Bush's tenure in the
Oval Office.
The Gulf War forced President Bush to press Congress for
funds to support the War, which meant less money allocated for




85 Id. at 327.
86 THOMAS PETZINGERJR., HARD LANDING: THE Epic CONTEST FOR POWER AND
PROFITS THAT PLUNGED THE AIRLINES INTO CHAOS 325 (1996).
87 PETER CAPPELLI, INTRODUCTION TO AIRLINE LABOR REIATIONS IN THE GLOBAL
ERA: THE NEW FRONTIER 3 (Peter Cappelli ed., Cornell Univ. Press 1995).
88 Id.
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the airline industry.89 In order to stave off bankruptcy, airline
executives streamlined their operations to make up for the
money that Congress had promised them. Despite these efforts,
by 1993, the industry faced a horrendous financial crisis. Over
the previous three years, the entire airline industry had lost
more than $10 billion."0
To attempt to relieve the crisis, newly elected United States
President Bill Clinton called for a mandatory meeting with in-
dustry leaders, including labor unions, to resolve the financial
strife hampering the airlines. He called for the formation of the
National Committee to Ensure a Strong Competitive Airline In-
dustry to provide stability that the industry badly needed."l As a
result, airline officials noticed an improvement in labor rela-
tions, and watched their companies once again rise to profitabil-
ity.92 However, that profitability was short lived. Rising fuel
prices and further expansion in the industry increased competi-
tion, thereby forcing major carriers such as TWA and Reno Air
to merge with larger airlines such as American (which they did,
the former in 1997, the latter in 2000) or go out of business."
VI. CONCLUSION: RETURN TO REGULATION?
Since the inception of the airline industry in 1915, federal
policy substantially affected and changed it in many ways, espe-
cially in the second half of the twentieth century. Regulation of
the industry proved useful by controlling the number of partici-
pating airlines, limiting the number of flights, and providing
uniform airfare structures. However, after World War II federal
policy largely was ineffective as the airline industry grew at an
unprecedented rate and airports expanded at a feverish pace
just to keep up with the explosive growth in passenger demand.
Airlines added faster and larger aircraft to their fleets, more ser-
vice routes, and repeatedly urged the federal government to
change airfare structures. Airport officials continuously re-
quested funds from the federal government to upgrade airport
facilities and airport pavement surfaces to keep up with the ex-
pansion of airline, air cargo, and general aviation traffic. Air
traffic controllers had to handle increasingly larger workloads
89 Id. at 13.
9o Id. at 13.





with antiquated technology. Navigation equipment routinely
failed, frustrating pilots and nearly causing aircraft collisions.
The federal government consistently was slow to respond with
funding and implemented necessary changes only when neces-
sary to deal with an immediate crisis. The FAA, in particular,
demonstrated this sluggish response by failing to implement
new laws and enforce existing regulations concerning flight
safety.
Deregulation seemed to be the remedy for an ailing airline
industry and financially strapped commercial airports. One
noted scholar, Thomas Petzinger, claims that deregulation had,
in fact, already been in place prior to Congressi6nal approval of
the Deregulation Act. 4 Petzinger contends
few realized it at the time, but deregulation was well underway
even before anyone had uttered the word .... Nearly forty years
of regulation had stifled competition, but not dulled the impulse
to compete .... Regulation had only forced airline executives to
engage in mutated forms of competition .... As a feat of legisla-
tion, deregulation only legitimized behavior that was already tak-
ing place.9 5
By allowing free competition, deregulation enabled airlines to
establish their own pricing structures and service regions. Many
new airlines seized the opportunity to participate. However,
deregulation also provided opportunities for too much competi-
tion and corporate raiding, exposing serious industry vulnerabil-
ities. Major airlines experienced their worst fear: that smaller
carriers would invade their markets and offer lower fares to at-
tract consumers. Today, low-fare airlines such as Southwest and
JetBlue control many regional markets once dominated by ma-
jor airlines such as United, American, Northwest, and Delta.
Furthermore, skyrocketing fuel prices also have stressed the
budgets of many companies (except for Southwest, who hedged
its fuel bids). As a result, to remain competitive, many major
airlines have downsized their fleets and asked for significant
wage cuts and concessions from their employees. Nonetheless,
federal policy always has affected the commercial air travel in-
dustry in one way or another and will continue to do so well into
the future. But the overarching question remains: will the in-
dustry someday return to regulation? We can only wait.
94 Id. at 86.
95 Id.
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